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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research is to give insights to the security-development 
nexus from an autoethnographic perspective. It is thus empirically based on my 
own experiences as a Civil Military Cooperation Officer in Helmand, Afghanistan 
2008-2009, and it aims to reveal how the security-development nexus plays out 
on the ground. Accordingly, it will look into the challenges and tensions between 
security and development while answering the following problem formulation: 
How do soldiers who are involved and emplaced in the security-development 
nexus experience and deal with the tensions inherent between security and 
development? It reaches the conclusion that there is a necessity for the security 
of both developer and developee in order to create conditions for development. 
In addition, it reveals that security plays out differently in time and space in the 
warscape in Helmand and moreover; it reveals how multiple development tasks 
are carried out by security forces in the Danish comprehensive approach, lastly 
pointing to the challenges of translating development policies into tactical terms. 
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1 - Introduction 
The purpose of this first chapter of the report is to introduce the problem area, 
the ‘security-development nexus’, and explain why and how it poses interesting 
and relevant questions for research. After the first two main sections of this 
introduction, which first gives a descriptive account for the security-development 
nexus and then a critique of it, I will move on to explain why and how I have 
approached and utilised my own experiences as a soldier in Afghanistan in the 
research, which will lead to the problem formulation, research question and 
lastly the project design. 
1.1 The Security-Development Nexus 
In the aftermath of the tragic events of 9/11, the role of security has been given 
new attention and importance globally. Suddenly the overall threat was seen as 
the one of terrorism and in order to counter it, the war on terror was declared. 
As a root cause, policy makers and researchers quickly acknowledged that 
underdevelopment, economic inequality, conflict and poor governance create 
conditions for the emergence of terrorism. (Stepputat, et al., 2007) Identifying 
development as an instrument for achieving security increasingly linked the two 
together in the security-development nexus. The thoughts are not new, they 
originally stem from the Cold War, (Beall et al. 2006, Stepputat et al. 2007, IPA 
2004) but today, in the aftermath of 9/11, it is still “(…) commonplace to assert 
that security and development are interlinked, interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing.” (IPA, 2004, p. 7) 
Many international agencies have adopted the thoughts of the security-
development nexus; it was a logic response to the peace operations of the 1990s 
where international forces were mostly involved in political transitions as 
opposed to prior aims of retaining international status quo. (IPA, 2004) UNDP 
administrator Mark Malloch Brown however, in 2004 emphasized the need to 
devise a conceptual framework that could encompass the complex link between 
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conflict and development and today, most security and development agencies 
have formulated comprehensive approaches (IPA, 2004). 
The Danish comprehensive approach is explained by Stepputat (2012) in the 
following way: 
In a curious reversal of the securitization argument, the government held that the military 
provision of ‘security’ was rolled out in order to enable ‘development’ for the Afghan 
population. But, since development agencies could not provide development without 
military presence and protection, the civil and military operators had to work together. 
This explained the need for a concept for civil–military cooperation such as the CPA. 
(Stepputat, 2012, p. 450) 
Accordingly, it seeks to grasp and develop those identified essential key factors 
to stabilisation which are governance, security sector and rule of law (IPA, 2004). 
These are factors that is believed to create the conditions for progress and are all 
entailed in the much popular policy ‘Security Sector Reform’ (SSR). The new 
policy, according to Beall et al., (2006) and Amer & Ashok (2012), reveals that 
there has been a merger between ‘Human Development’ and ‘Human Security’. 
The principles of SSR are all matters that development agencies much oblige with 
in new ‘development interventions’. (Stepputat, et al., 2007) 
Because development is today seen as a tool for preventing terrorism and 
thereby enhancing security, there has been a ‘securitisation of development’ 
(Stepputat, et al., 2007), as opposed to previous times, during the Cold War, 
where development was an aim in itself. (Beall, et al., 2006) The Danish policy for 
Development Assistance state: “(…) in order to achieve sustainable security ‘at 
home’, the pursuit of progress in the developing world is now vital as a tool of 
foreign policy.” (Beall, et al., 2006, p. 52) Denmark has thus taken a lead in 
viewing development as a tool not only for security, but as a tool for own 
security. (Beall, et al., 2006) The security-development nexus is thereby, in 
combination to trends of prevention, much more intrusive than previous policies 
of development. 
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Disseminating the security-development nexus and taking a closer look to the 
entailed concepts it is found that ‘security’ has developed and become a matter 
of ‘human security’ as a result of, among other, the events in Rwanda and 
Bosnia. In addition, most conflicts today are intra-state (IPA, 2004) thus been 
necessary to legitimise international intervention in order to protect human 
beings. Security is therefore today linked to ‘soft’ values such as human rights 
and equality as opposed to prior notions of e.g. state security. Stepputat, et al., 
(2007) argue: “(…) security has been “developmentalised” in the sense that a 
number of basic human needs have been suggested as being indispensable for 
the survival of the individual.”  (Stepputat, et al., 2007, p. 10) Development has 
also undergone changes during time. Previously development would occur after 
a conflict had ended, but today however, it is happening during and through 
conflict. Whereas development has traditionally been thought of as focusing on 
creating economic progress and promoting education for example, it is today 
ascribed much more value as the new development policies (such as SSR) 
essentially argues that societies will adopt beliefs of human rights and principles 
of democracy. 
1.2 Critique of the Security-Development Nexus 
Though governments and development agencies formulate development 
strategies in which the link between security and development is often taken for 
granted, there are many scholars and institutions that question the connection; 
for example Chandler 2007, Beall et al. 2006 and Amer et al. 2012) 
From an overall perspective, the problem with the security-development nexus is 
according to Beall et al. (2006) that it is indirectly arguing, without any clear 
evidence, that the opposite of security and development is terrorism and 
poverty. In fact, as Beall et al. (2006) argues, al Qaeda recruits are often not of 
particular low economic status. In addition, they add, it is impossible to claim 
that a particular development strategy will lead to an increase or decrease in risk 
of terrorism, and often the entire discourse has a tendency of equating terrorism 
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and political Islam. (Beall, et al., 2006) Moreover, the nexus is often working with 
a loose or even undefined concept of terrorism. (Beall, et al., 2006) Another 
problem with adopting the security-development nexus is that it breaks with the 
traditional view; that development is an aim itself. Beall et al. (2006) are 
concerned because the nexus mixes the field of development and national 
security which has been separated by effort for over 30 years, making security at 
home the overriding priority: “Security may indeed be conceptualised as both 
objective of, and instrument for, development.” (Beall, et al., 2006, p. 53) Both 
Beall et al. (2006) and Chandler (2007) claim that poverty reduction should be 
the aim in its own right arguing that “(…) the separation of development policy 
from the elements of government dealing exclusively with the national interest is 
essential.” (Beall, et al., 2006, p. 53) Chandler (2007) argues that only when well-
meaning is the objective, effective policies can be devised. Instead, by 
approaching development with the objective to gain greater security, rich 
countries consequently allocate most of their aid to countries that are perceived 
as a threat rather than to the most poor. (Amer, et al., 2012) In this way the 
nexus is concerned with rich and powerful countries’ short-term considerations 
of security rather than long term developmental change in poor regions. (Amer, 
et al., 2012) 
Amer et al. (2012) thus state: “There is no doubt that this securitization trend of 
the aid policy has further reduced the already limited resources available for the 
development to the poor countries.” (Amer, et al., 2012, p. 2) Chandler (2007) 
argues that the consequences of the security-development nexus is; “(…) a more 
inward-looking approach to foreign policy, more concerned with self-image than 
the policy consequences in the areas concerned.” (Chandler, 2007, p. 362) He 
subsequently refers to the security-development nexus as a concept of anti-
foreign policy that is non-instrumental and bears little relationship to practice on 
the ground while being unconcerned with the object of the policy. (Chandler, 
2007) 
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Looking closer at the nexus, scholars additionally question whether there actually 
is a link between security and relationship and Chandler (2007) argues that 
failing to explain the link indicate that it is mostly based on rhetorical claims 
rather than policy-making: there is no clear political framework in the policy. 
(Chandler, 2007) Regarding the definition of concepts in the nexus Amer et al., 
argues that it; 
(…) resonate[s] as confusion, lack of conceptual clarity and ideological divisions at best, 
and as rhetorical facades, interest politics and shallow political correctness at worst (…) 
Academic discourses have not – in spite of the high stakes – adequately addressed this 
term, ‘nexus’. (Amer, et al., 2012, p. 16) 
By not defining concepts, the nexus is open to all kinds of (illicit) use and 
acceptable politics, (Amer, et al., 2012) Herby, a gap that permeates the entire 
policy is created: Not only is there a lack of coherence between institutional 
bodies but there are also disparities between policy and implementation. (Amer, 
et al., 2012) The lack of coherence is not only addressed by Amer et al. (2012) 
but also by Chandler (2007) who interpret this concern as a crisis in policy-
making in which actors are attempting to shift responsibility to others. 
Moreover, he views it as a lack of belief in the results achievable with the policy 
and argues that with no clear objective the policy could not be better 
coordinated and that it is a new trend that completely separates policy-making 
and outcomes. IPA (2004) support the latter argument stating that there “(…) 
remains a real disconnect between what is envisioned in international assistance 
programs and what transpires on the ground.” (IPA, 2004, p. 14), a view that is 
also shared by Chandler (2007), Stepputat (2012) and Amer et al. (2012) 
Behind these arguments, scholars present concerns over mixing humanitarian 
issues with military (Stepputat, 2012) and arguing that “(…) development has 
been “radicalised” in its civilizing mission.” (Duffield in Stepputat, et al., 2007, 
p.10) 
Finally, the security-development nexus is accused of framing security thus 
representing issues in a manner that they appear exceptional and a question of 
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survival in order to enable means and gain acceptance (Stepputat, 2012). This is 
done by criminalising the poor which; 
[It] allows us to glimpse, for instance, at how ‘poor people’ are being situated and 
represented in this text. Poor people, the text implies, are dangerous and threaten the 
security of us all. They therefore should be controlled by ‘development’ and (assumedly) 
good governance. (Amer, et al., 2012, p. 32) 
1.3 Project motivation 
As an implication of the security-development nexus and the war on terror, a 
decision was made, to conduct an international intervention in Afghanistan. 
Explaining the presence and effort in Afghanistan, the Danish Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Ministry state as the very first lines of the document ‘The Danish Effort 
in Afghanistan’ [free translation] that; 
The overriding purpose of the Danish effort in Afghanistan is to contribute to national, 
regional and global security by preventing that the country yet again will serve as a safe 
haven for terrorists. [Free translation] (Ministries, 2008, p. 1) 
Thus, the security-development nexus has proven to be dominant in the case of 
Afghanistan. 
Summing up from the previous two sections, the security-development nexus is 
being accused for not presenting a real framework and not having any 
connection to how it is implemented on the ground. In fact there is not much 
literature to be found on how actors are experiencing the security-development 
nexus in practice, which has been pointed out by Stepputat (2012). He was 
appointed to review the Danish Comprehensive Approach (CPA) and had 
ambitions to finally conduct field work instead of conducting yet another policy 
analysis distant to the field, but due to poor security it was impossible to carry 
out. 
The motivation for this project derives from these observations and it intrigues 
me to utilise my own personal experiences from the time that I was deployed as 
a Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) officer in Helmand province, Afghanistan, in 
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August 2008 to February 2009. I wish to look closer into my own experience as 
an actor within the security-development nexus or more accurately; I want to 
analyse and gain understanding for the actors’ perspectives in this field and the 
tensions between conducting both security and development. 
I view the security-development nexus not as policy problem or as a theory but 
as a broad field of inquiry to which I will adopt an autoethnographic approach, 
thus putting myself at the centre as both the object and source of knowledge 
production. I will present and discuss the autoethnographic approach in the next 
chapter. 
1.4 Problem formulation 
With this introduction to the problem area and approach for the project, I have 
formulated the following problem formulation: 
How do soldiers who are involved and emplaced in the security-development 
nexus experience and deal with the tensions inherent between security and 
development? 
The purpose of this project is thus to give insights to how soldiers operationalize 
the security-development nexus and reveal what happens when development 
and security is introduced at the same time. I will reveal how the security-
development nexus plays out on the ground, what are the challenges and how 
they affect not only the local people but also the soldiers. Furthermore, it will 
portray how soldiers think about development and security and what 
considerations that lie behind the decisions that are made on the ground in 
addition to giving insights to the practical role as a security-development actor. 
Thereby, the overall aim is to bring new information, from a field perspective, to 
the discussion on the security-development nexus as it has been criticised of 
lacking to do so. As mentioned in the previous section, I will carry out this project 
by adopting an autoethnographic approach, thus using my own deployment to 
Afghanistan in order to provide this insight to the security-development nexus. 
8 
 
The following section will therefore explain the delimitations of the research 
with regards to the time of my deployment, the area I was deployed in etc. 
1.7 Delimitations and limitations 
This section provides an explanation of the delimitations of the research thus 
explaining the areas it will enter into and those it will not address, in addition to 
a brief comment on the limitations of the design and data. 
Geography. 
This project is concerned with my own personal experience in Helmand, 
Afghanistan. Helmand is a province in the southern part of the country and the 
Danish battle group’s1 area of responsibility is I Nahr-e Saraj districs with the city 
Gereshk in the centre. See a map and the area I operated in chapter 4. 
Development strategies. 
The aim of this project is not to look into, or evaluate, the Afghan Compact, The 
Afghan Development Strategy or other development strategies. It will therefore 
not get specific into those documents, nor the results of those, but focus on 
viewing the security-development nexus from a more overall perspective 
revealing how it is operationalized on the ground. 
Time period. 
As this project is concerned with my deployment on ISAF team 6, it is limited in 
time ranging from august 4th 2008 to February 14th 2009 with the exception of 
leave from December 5th to January 1st. 
Data limitations. 
I have used my patrol reports and personal mission diary for support and 
clarification of facts in my writing. As the reports are classified it is not possible 
for me to attach them. I have addressed the patrol reports in section 2.6. 
                                                          
1
 The Danish unit 
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Design limitations. 
When adopting an autoethnographic approach, there are some points of critique 
and limitations to the possibility of replication, due to the subjective character of 
the research, which I have addressed in section 2.4. 
1.8 Project Design 
The project is structured so that the following chapter will introduce and explain 
the methodological considerations of the project and explain the 
autoethnographic approach. It will also briefly touch upon the criticism of the 
approach before explaining participant-observation. Subsequently, a section will 
explain how the approach is applicable to this research followed by a 
presentation of the literature reviewed and utilised in the research. The third 
chapter will provide information about my background and the training I 
received before deploying, followed by a section that shortly describes how I 
think I was viewed from the perspective of the local Afghans. The fourth chapter 
will present the physical setting in which I was operating; Gereshk and the rural 
area, in addition to explaining what types of work CIMIC was conducting in 
Afghanistan. Chapter five presents events I have experienced, in a diary style, 
and on the basis of this the project’s sixth chapter will serve both as an analysis 
and discussion of the key themes that have been identified in chapter five. 
Finally, chapter seven will entail the conclusion, followed by chapter eight which 
will present the afterthoughts. 
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2 – Methods 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodological decisions behind the 
research. First and briefly the methodological choices will be presented followed 
by a presentation of the autoethnographic approach followed by an explanation 
on participant-observation and lastly a separate section that clarifies how and 
why it is applicable to the research. 
2.1 Methodology 
As presented in the previous chapter, this research is conducted from an 
autoethnographic approach. The research strategy is thus qualitative and 
epistemologically interpretivist as it seeks to understand social order by 
examining the interpretation of that world by its participants (Bryman, 2008). 
Thereby the ontology becomes constructionist as it is believed that ‘what is’ is 
created out of social interaction which cannot be separated from those 
individuals involved in the interaction, thus there is no external truth. (Bryman, 
2008) Lastly, the research design is inductive as it is not meant to test a theory 
because, as explained in section 1.3, I view the security-development nexus not 
as a theory but rather as a broad field of inquiry. 
2.2 Autoethnography 
International relations studies are often striving to be independent and objective 
in regards to knowledge production, in order for the knowledge to be considered 
valid and scientific (Brigg & Bleiker, 2010). However, a new trend is emerging in 
international relations studies, in which autoethnography is being advocated. It is 
called autoethnography because the inquiry method it ethnographical and 
autobiographical at the same time. The main arguments for developing 
autoethnography in international relations is that, as feminists argue, the role of 
the author, or researcher, can never be erased thus, it is better to acknowledge 
this fact rather than attempt to disguise it. (Brigg & Bleiker, 2010) In addition, it 
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is argued that autoethnography is able to provide meaningful insights to politics 
as Brigg & Bleiker (2010) state; “(…) the objective of research is to ‘to learn facts 
about the real world’” (Brigg & Bleiker, 2010, p. 782) Thus, in an ideal scenario of 
autoethnography, the author is able to provide insights that is otherwise 
dismissed and devalued (Brigg & Bleiker, 2010), or as mentioned by Dauphinee 
(2010) it should re-centre attention to the lives and deaths of people whose 
destinies we would otherwise not know about. 
The greatest concern regarding the methodology in autoethnography is that the 
author becomes both the object and source of knowledge. Advocates Brigg & 
Bleiker (2010), stress that they do not accept autoethnography at face value but 
argue in favour of autoethnography by explaining that they see knowledge as 
dependent and relative, derived from involvement with others, stating that; 
Because knowledge is social and relational, we will never be able to step beyond questions 
of power and legitimacy in the production and reception of knowledge. But this is 
precisely the reason why autoethnographies are useful: they can expose and perhaps even 
shape these relations. (Brigg & Bleiker, 2010, p. 791) 
External relations are thus important to how an author conceptualises, analyses, 
and communicates (Brigg & Bleiker, 2010, p. 794). Neumann (2010) adds another 
dimension to these thoughts and draws attention to Marcel Mauss’ idea that 
three systems meet in the body: The physiological, psychological and the social 
system. These systems are mediated by language and can only be understood 
through that. (Neumann, 2010) The physical system for instance situates the 
author in terms of race or gender e.g. and in that way offers a particular 
perspective of the world, like the psychological condition of the author also plays 
an important role. (Neumann, 2010) In regards to methodological concerns, 
Neumann (2010) support Brigg and Bleiker’s (2010) view that when the authors 
sees him- or herself as an inseparable part of the world, it is possible to make a 
reflexivist choice which means that if the social consists of stuff (also individuals) 
produced by structures and structures are known through their effects, then it is 
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possible to investigate the individual and understand oneself as a product of a 
certain culture or power/knowledge. (Neumann, 2010) 
The aim for autoethnography is to provide otherwise unattainable insights to the 
effects of politics, and Briggs & Bleiker furthermore adds that; 
(…) the author’s position should be evaluated not by some a priori standard of reference, 
but by their ability to generate new and valuable insights for particular knowledge 
communities. For instance, if examinations of an author’s personal experience can provide 
explanations of political features or behaviour that would not have been possible through 
other, more conventional accounts, then they have made a contribution to knowledge. 
(Brigg & Bleiker, 2010, p. 792) 
Brigg & Bleiker (2010) suggest that autoethnographic studies should be pursued 
in three ways: The first one is conducting puzzle-driven research guided by 
concrete political problems that establishes the frame of the puzzle and then 
identifies research questions to help focus and structure the investigation into 
the puzzle. The methodology in this investigation is legitimate when it helps to 
address and better understand the puzzle. (Brigg & Bleiker, 2010) In practical 
terms they explain that there are three basic elements in the research, which to 
some extent are the thoughts also presented by Neumann (2010): 1) It is 
important for the author to be vulnerable and susceptible to new experiences in 
order to 2) mobilise his or hers intuition and emotions, they refer to it is felt 
experiences, while in that way, the author’s experiences becomes a way to 
understand these otherwise inaccessible social and political relations. 3) Push 
limits of disciplinary thinking by exploring consequences and accept that 
knowledge is inherently relational and analyse and present data in a way that is 
meaningful to others. (Brigg & Bleiker, 2010) Brigg and Bleiker (2010) lastly point 
out that autoethnographies should contain a level of self-reflection that is 
sensitive to societal contexts, revealing the processes the author has gone 
through and how he or she interpreted interactions with others. 
In this project I have drawn on the ethnography of aid by Mosse (2004) and de 
Sardan (2005) who are presented in the literature review, section 2.6. 
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2.3 Participant-observation 
Autoethnographic knowledge has its roots in qualitative sociology and is, 
according to Bryman (2008), closely linked to participant-observation. In 
participant-observation, the observer is a full functioning member of the social 
setting, and the role of the observer is known to the other members. (Bryman, 
2008) Guest et al., (2013) draws attention to the cliché “you had to be there” and 
explains that this is exactly what participant-obeservation is about: Often, there 
are important elements in human interactions that are only visible to those 
present thus participant-observation aims for capturing these elements. (Guest, 
et al., 2013) 
Most often, this qualitative research strategy is unstructured and uncovers rules 
and and norms that underlie observable behaviour and it is useful because it 
opens up areas and makes it possible to collect a wide range of data that would 
be impossible to obtain by any other method. (Guest, et al., 2013) In addition, it 
enbles the researcher to know what questions that are important to as it enables 
the researcher to view the social reality of the people in it. (Guest, et al., 2013) 
2.4 Critique of autoethnography 
As the autoethnographic approach is rooted in qualitative research, it is critiqued 
in the same areas as other qualitative methods: Most importantly, there are 
great concerns about the objectivity, validity and replication difficulties. As the 
method is based on subjective experiences it is possible for him or the author to 
leave out information that other on the other hand may have found significant. 
The reason for this is that the step of data collection can occur simultaneously 
with the analysis/interpretation because of the author’s central role to the 
research. As a result the validity can be questioned, as it may prove impossible to 
replicate the research and reach the same conclusions. This critique is important 
to bear in mind when choosing to employ an ethnographic approach and an 
important aspect is for the researcher to be transparent in explaining what was 
experienced or done and how this has led to the conclusion. (Bryman, 2008) In 
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the following section I will address the criticism and explanation why the 
autoethnographic approach is appropriate for this research. 
2.5 Applicability to the research and case 
The autoethnographic approach to this research fits neatly with the project area 
not only because it enables me to utilise experiences from my deployment in 
Afghanistan, but because the problem area, the security-development nexus, is 
being criticised for not being connected to the policy implementation. The 
autoethnographic approach is therefore utilised in order to give insight to the 
debate which is mainly unconcerned with policy implementation and the local 
level. (Stepputat, 2012) The problem, in the case of Afghanistan, is however not 
that authors are being dismissed or devalued as argued by Brigg & Bleiker (2010), 
rather the security situation has made it impossible to conduct traditional 
research in areas such as Helmand where the security-development nexus really 
stands its test. Regarding the criticism of autoethnography, the replication 
difficulties, I realise that this is a valid point; however, the main argument for 
autoethnography is exactly that the role of the author can never be erased. 
Regarding the subjectivity concerns, the project is structured so that it will 
present a diary style of experienced events in a separate chapter before moving 
onto reflecting and discussing the themes that I have subtracted from this 
presentation. The idea is to have the reader experience what I experienced 
instead of experiencing my experiences, in order to provide transparency. The 
diary is based on memory, pictures, patrol reports and a personal mission diary; 
presented and explained in the following section. 
Regarding the participant-observation; while I was not deployed as a researcher 
while in Afghanistan (and the research was therefore not planned) it is based on 
my personal experiences which I now, with some distance both in terms of time 
and analysis (in terms of my newly gained background in social science), analyse 
retrospectively. Because I was deployed as a soldier, I was engaging in the local 
community but not becoming a part of it. The conditions of my interactions with 
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the locals differed from them meeting me in the camp or me meeting them on 
patrol, in full uniform, helmet, weapons, body armour and so on. The meetings 
therefore differed between a few minutes on the ground as opposed to half or 
whole hours in the camp. I was a very active participant in the sense that on 
patrols, I would make contact with the local people and had I not met them 
before I was prepared to ask specific questions about what they thought about 
the security situation, their challenges and who they thought could help them: 
What can be viewed as short semi-structured interviews. Not only because my 
questions were semi-structured, but also due to the open role as a soldier, it is 
highly likely that some of the answers that I was given were influenced by these 
facts. I have addressed my thoughts on how I thought I was perceived in section 
3.3. 
2.6 Literature reviewed and utilised.  
The following section will present the literature that has been reviewed and 
utilised in the project report, thus presenting academic articles, reports and 
books in addition to the patrol reports and mission diary that the fourth chapter 
is based on. 
First I have utilised texts by Beall et al., (2006), Amer, et al., (2012), Chandler, 
(2007) and IPA, (2004) describing the origin of the security-development nexus 
and how it differs from former thoughts of development. It is important to note 
that these texts are mostly critical of the nexus but their strength is that they 
attempt to scrutinise the concepts in the nexus thus revealing how security and 
development can be linked together in new ways of understanding. I especially 
found that the text from IPA provided good background information on the 
security-development nexus. It has been necessary to use ‘critical’ texts because 
the security-development nexus cannot be traced to one official approach so to 
speak, but rather it is expressed through development policies in countries such 
as Canada and Denmark. (See section 1.1 for further explanation). 
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Furthermore I have utilised two texts; one by Mosse (2004) and one by de 
Sardan (2005), on the ethnography aid in order to account for how development 
policies are connected to development and implementation. In addition, they 
also explain the relationship between developers and developees: The book of 
de Sardan (2005) is highly critical of the notions that developers most often have 
about the area of development, which in de Sardan’s case is the Sahel. Some of 
his observations, I found, are not similar to my experiences and I have therefore 
additionally drawn on the writings of Korf et al., (2010) and their notions of 
warscape. This text helps explain the complex and fluid security situation, over 
time and space, which was often more dominant than the focus areas of de 
Sardan (2005) and Mosse (2004). 
For the fourth chapter, the diary of events, I have relied on my patrol reports, 
pictures, and my own personal mission diary. I started my mission diary the day 
of deploying in order to document and vent my feelings about the deployment, 
the work and the people I met and worked with. It found that it was useful as the 
days tended to blur. The purpose of the diary was to be able to look back and 
remember both good and bad things, but most importantly I had asked a 
colleague to hand it over to my boyfriend in Denmark in the case I was killed, in 
order for him to get insight of my work and thoughts. In the beginning I wrote in 
it every day but later in the tour, as I settled more and became more used to the 
new ‘normal’ it became less frequently with about 10 days apart. The diary has 
only had a supportive role as it in some of the events described has entailed a 
few lines about what I have experienced but mostly I have relied on the patrol 
reports and pictures in addition to my memory. 
The patrol reports were conducted after each patrol, they were quite extensive 
and took at least a couple of hours to write as they entail information about who 
was on the patrol, who was force protection unit, which stops we made and 
what objective was: Who did we meet (including pictures), where, what did we 
talk about, how was the atmospherics and what were the recommendations and 
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lessons learned. Because I was writing down information of all the stops I made, I 
would sometimes structure the conversation in bullet points whereas other 
times the situation called for more elaborating writing. The patrol reports were 
based on the notes that either I, or my driver Jens, wrote down during 
conversations on the patrol. In addition we would take from 2 to up to 25 
pictures of people and surroundings of each place we visited which has also 
helped recalling the patrols. When the meetings took place in the camp I would 
take notes during the meetings and write it in a summary, along with pictures, 
afterwards. Other incidents, such as walk-ins2, helping other units with injured 
locals, mass casualties of locals after suicide bombers and such, were written in a 
journal at the office or an incident report, in which time, what happened, 
picture, what happened and recommendation of actions were described. As 
mentioned in the limitations of the project, the journal and patrol reports are 
classified thus it is not possible to attach them as appendixes. 
2.7 Summary of chapter 2 
This chapter has outlined the methodological choices of the research in addition 
to presenting the approach of the project, autoethnography. Furthermore, it has 
presented participant-observation and a critique of autoethnography, revealing 
the limitations to the approach. The explanation of the applicability of the 
research has also been addressed before presenting the literature reviewed and 
utilised in the research. 
                                                          
2
 When the local Afghan comes to the main-gate without having scheduled a meeting 
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3 – Entering the security-development nexus 
The purpose of the following chapter is to introduce my personal background 
and give insights to the CIMIC training and how I believed that the local Afghans 
perceived me. This is done in order for the reader to become familiar with me 
and to give insights to my expectations of the deployment before presenting 
some of my experiences in chapter 5. 
3.1 Preparing for deployment 
I joined the army in 2003 when I had just turned 19 and by the time I was 20 I 
was a platoon commander in a basic training unit for enlisted personnel. The 
following four years I served as both a fire directing officer at Danish Artillery 
Regiment and platoon commander for contracted soldiers while I had doubts 
about what I wanted to do next with regards to education. In early November 
2007 I decided that ‘something had to happen’ so I talked to my commanding 
officer and told him that I wanted to be deployed, but not as a forward observer 
which was the other function the regiment could offer, but as a CIMIC officer. I 
wanted to work with something new and I thought that I might be able to use my 
CIMIC skills as a civilian as well. Just a week before starting the mission training 
an entire CIMIC support team was killed in action by a suicide bomber in Gereshk 
which set the tone for the severity of the work. I did not get more nervous about 
it, I knew the risk and had not fully realised what I was about to do. 
3.2 Becoming a ‘development’ expert 
For the next four months I trained with the CIMIC detachment that I was a part 
of. It consisted of 14 soldiers; 7 officers, 5 sergeant majors and one private 1st 
class. The detachment formed 5 CIMIC support teams, each consisting of a 
commanding officer (an officer) and a commissioned officer (a sergeant major) in 
addition to a small staff of three; the detachment’s commanding officer, the 
second-in-command and a sergeant major conducting administration tasks. We 
trained the traditional soldier skills but in addition we had to learn about CIMIC. 
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We were in Holland at the CIMIC Centre of Excellence and we had courses in 
Denmark with lectures by the ministry of defence, ministry of foreign affairs, 
Danish Red Cross, Danish Refugee Council and so on. The training we received 
was to make us able to conduct projects whose aim was to help gain support of 
the military presence and operation in the area however, as the security 
situation in the Danish Area of Responsibility is, and was, severely dangerous, my 
role as development actor was much more far-reaching than what was 
formulated in the military objective. 
The courses were a contrast to our military training and dominated by power 
points, templates and the economic and political background of our work. From 
the beginning I was sceptical about the ‘logical framework approach’ to use 
when conducting projects, knowing that the practical conditions of my work did 
not offer the time and place for this work. I was right. I normally like to learn 
about cultures but I also struggled when an anthropologist held a briefing about 
how she had visited Afghanistan in the 1970s and lived with the locals, which I 
thought gave no good view of the situation that we were going to experience. I 
also had some trouble with the information we were given about Pashtunwali3. 
We were explained that if we, in worst case, were separated from the patrol, we 
could seek asylum with a local family; call nanawatai4 and then they were obliged 
to protect us. I thought that was a little optimistic, but I chose to subtract from it 
that Pashtuns were very honourable people.  Moreover, I have to mention that 
we were given a little handbook from the United States Marine Corps in which 
the culture of different tribes was described. We laughed about it a lot as it 
expressed an even more simplistic view of Afghanistan than what we were told. 
Among one of the most interesting points it said that Taliban fighters could be 
recognised by their black turbans. This was quickly dismissed by previous CIMIC 
soldiers but we were actually confronted with the rumour by other Danish 
                                                          
3
 A traditional Pashtun code of honor/ethics. (Kakar, n.d) 
4
 A concept that requires the tribe/household that one seeks sanctuary in has to protect you at all 
costs, Ibid.  
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soldiers when we got to Afghanistan. I do not have the handbook anymore as I 
believed that we were given better briefings by other anthropologists so I cannot 
refer to it, but I found a story online which confirms that the myth was still going 
on strong in 2009, it thus explains: 
I just returned from a council meeting in Kandahar," he said. Manan laughed as he 
explained that the U.S. and NATO forces think they can identify the Taliban by their black 
turbans – but they don't understand that they only wear black at certain times. He 
seemed to enjoy pointing out that the Taliban are Afghans and dress like Afghans, which 
he said means they wear "baggy trousers, long loose-fitting shirts and white turbans.” 
(Ahmad, 2009) 
In Holland we were introduced to basic CIMIC in the auspices of NATO and it 
focused on conducting ‘traditional’ CIMIC work such as baseline assessments5, 
setting up a CIMIC centre where the local people can come and meet the CIMIC 
soldiers, working with non-government organisations and government 
organisation etc. The courses in Denmark were specifically focused on 
Afghanistan and were focussing on what kind of work we could expect to do, 
such as, cash for work, quick impact projects and psychological operations. Cash 
for work was intended to get some money into the local communities in order 
for Taliban not to recruit the unemployed and the quick impact projects were 
aimed for creating consent for the presence of ISAF soldiers and opening a door 
to future cooperation and development. “Don’t make promises!” was the dogma, 
as we could not risk the political failure of not being able to deliver. In addition, 
the projects had to be sustainable thus ownership was an important aspect of 
the justification of a project, referred to as ‘Afghan face’; no Danish flags would 
be on any projects; the locals would have to want the project, take ownership for 
it and be able to sustain it themselves. All the time ‘samtænkning’ (a Danish 
word for thinking together) or comprehensive approach was the key word while 
one of the slides in the power point presentation explained: CIMIC is to make 
politics work! 
                                                          
5
 An assessment of an area that is divided into that provides information about health, sanitation, 
security, schools and so on.  
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We would have to conduct both short-term CIMIC projects along with long-term 
development projects. There was mostly emphasis on the CIMIC projects but not 
much on the technicalities thus I only remember that we were explained the 
official requirements of a well; it has to be 80mtrs deep and the materials used 
for the pump must be standard so that it was possible to buy spare parts. Other 
than that we gained some knowledge about projects by reading project 
proposals from the previous teams and it would be a matter of learning-by-
doing. 
Regarding our role as security and development actors, we were told that first 
and foremost CIMIC are soldiers or; “Every man is a rifle man”, which meant that 
although our task was to conduct CIMIC work we were expected to engage in the 
patrol, or guard duty, as any other soldier. We were also explained that it was 
not correct, as it had apparently been rumoured, that CIMIC could not accept 
information about the enemy: Although CIMIC soldiers are not agents of 
intelligence their interaction and relationship with the locals can put them in a 
position in which they are provided with information that should be passed on to 
the intelligence section. I was excited about this new job function, I was a soldier 
to the core and I was not really interested in the talk about neutrality: We were 
soldiers and we would work under those conditions so if I could gain information 
that would reveal e.g. a suicide bomber or an improvised explosive device, I 
would. 
In July 2008 we passed the certification exercise and we deployed on august 4th 
and were swiftly transported to our bases to take over for the current CIMIC 
team. My commanding officer had some weeks prior told me that I would be 
stationed in camp Price6, which I was not surprised about as I knew that there 
was a women’s centre in Gereshk, which was not far away from the camp and I 
was the only female in the detachment. There had been a female officer in Price 
a year before me, so I was given some information about the previous work she 
                                                          
6
 The CIMIC support teams were allocated in different forward operating bases, or camp Price 
(see chapter 4 for location), along with the infantry units  
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had conducted with the women, but that was only a side-task, my main area of 
responsibility was Gereshk and up to patrol baseline. (See figure 1, chapter 4). 
In Price the stabilisation advisors, stationed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
was placed in an office next to CIMIC. Over the time of my deployment there 
were between 0 and 3 advisors whereas one of them was British and they were 
responsible for the long-term development. We quickly established a good 
cooperation however, at one point my commanding officer felt that he lacked 
overview of what we (our second-in-command, another colleague and I) were 
discussing with the advisor with regards to projects, thus he told us to let all 
issues we wanted to discuss go through him. The advisor would provide 
information about requirements when purchasing furniture for schools or the 
distance between a well and latrines and other considerations that we should 
remember when conducting projects. Sometimes however, I was also handed 
information about the need for computer classes for the mayor’s staff, purchase 
of furniture for official buildings and such, which I would turn into project 
proposals and supervise until it was executed. 
My tasks in theatre were therefore very different; in some parts of Gereshk I was 
identifying and helping the stabilisation advisor conduct long-term development 
projects, and in other parts of the city, in which there was suspected Taliban safe 
havens, I conducted consent winning activities and quick impact projects such as: 
building wells, irrigation canals, bridges, roads, check points, mosque 
refurbishments, refurbishments of schools and claims7. In addition my 
commanding officer appointed me to be a functional specialist on electricity, 
health and education in addition to working with the women. I did not have any 
particular knowledge about these tasks and with regards to working with the 
women I was solely considered qualified due to my gender. I asked around on 
patrols to find out how the electricity system worked and if they paid for it. I 
went on patrols to the hospital and found a British doctor to go with me. That 
                                                          
7
 Paying for damages caused by combat. 
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way he could make a report of the medical conditions while I would look at more 
obvious stuff such as the need for beds, mattresses, sheets and such. I also 
looked into all the schools in the area trying to get information about the type 
and grades they had, the number of students, the principal and such. An 
educational advisor in Lashkar Gah visited us in Price in the beginning of our tour. 
At that point I did not realise why I needed to be acquainted with her, but when I 
became functional specialist I realised that she could provide me with templates 
of information she needed and I could get the information and ask her what I 
should do and what tasks the ministry of education should provide. Although I 
was not prepared for this work I liked it, but it was a learning experience for me 
which was also frustrating at times due to the many tasks. In the late fall a British 
military stabilisation and support team (5 soldiers) was allocated to Price and 
they took over the long-term development projects so the last two months I was 
mainly conducting CIMIC work. 
3.3 Navigating the field as a Danish (female) soldier 
My CIMIC support team was the only one that was not assigned an infantry unit, 
thus I had different units providing force protection8 when I went on patrol. That 
also meant that I, at times, had difficulties going on patrol because all units had 
other main tasks. However, my commanding officer was swift to emphasise for 
the battle group9 commander the importance of my patrolling after which a unit 
was ascribed. I have thus patrolled with everything from 6 military police 
officers, a British mentoring team for the Afghan National Army, reconnaissance 
units and an entire infantry platoon of around 30 soldiers. Due to my area of 
responsibility my patrols were conducted by driving to a place, dismounting the 
vehicles and walking around talking to people and then driving to another place, 
if the areas I had to visit were very far apart. I would ask the force protection unit 
to take me to the locations I needed to visit and they would plan the route, 
                                                          
8
 A unit of between 6-30 soldiers who would facilitate my security. 
9
 The Danish Battle Group is a term for the overall organizational structure of Danish soldiers 
deployed in Helmand under which the infantry units, tanks, CIMIC detachment etc. are assigned.  
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search for improved explosive devises on the way and provide security at the 
scene including searching people walking up to me and prevent vehicles from 
driving close by. My commanding officer assigned me an area of responsibility 
along with an effect. For instance DENY enemy influence or REASSURE the local 
population that we can help them. These effects are a part of the effect based 
operations approach which again is a part of the comprehensive approach both 
of which I will not get more into. One of the main tasks was also to conduct 
baseline assessments so in the beginning I chose some areas of interest, to which 
I wanted to go, in order to get information about the area, and then slowly I 
started to identify the different needs and possibilities depending on the security 
situation. As I also had to follow up on some of the projects started by the 
former team I was conducting projects from the very first patrol. I later learned 
that they had sometimes paid too much for wells in some areas and therefore 
one of our tasks was also to find information and give input to a ‘livelihood 
pricing’ document along with information about prices of multiple goods. 
I decided during my training in Denmark that I would not hide my long hair in a 
bun under my helmet, during patrols, as I would usually do when I was in the 
field. Instead I plaited it and left it hanging down my back so people could see it 
as I drove by. For the first time I thought that my gender could be an advantage 
as it would not only send a message to the local women I met on my way, but 
perhaps also give me an opportunity to see sides of the community that my male 
colleagues could not. I have often been asked by colleagues, family members and 
strangers whether local men ever refused to speak to me but fortunately that 
has never happened.  I once went to a place I had not been before and the 
children yelled “It’s a girl, it’s a girl!” my interpreter told me, but the local elder 
had a stone face not giving off any signs of surprise which I later found was very 
typical. I do not think that they had a problem with me being a woman because I 
was not Muslim and I was significantly different from Afghan women; I am tall, 
blond and officer; I had money and carried both a pistol and a rifle. As I also 
describe in chapter 4, after having patrolled for a little over a month, how 
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women started to appear and wave from the compounds and one time a group 
of young men even gathered and smiled and waved at me in the bazaar. 
Most of the time, I felt like a monkey in the zoo more than I felt that they viewed 
me as a woman but there were a few times I decided to refer to my boyfriend 
back home as my husband to get rid of some wooers (local workers in the camp), 
and one time I met some little girls who thought that it was very strange that I 
did not have children at home since I was ‘so old’. While I was deployed I got the 
chance to visit the women’s centre in Gereshk, girl schools, see the hospital 
including the women’s ward and attend Eid with the local male interpreters, so I 
was very fortunate. 
3.4 Summary of chapter 3 
This chapter has presented my personal background and the CIMIC detachment’s 
training prior to deployment. It has thereby shed a light on the types of projects 
we were expecting to conduct and what the character of these projects was in 
Afghanistan. They have revealed how the link between security and 
development has been operationalized in terms of the relationship between 
CIMIC and the stabilisation advisor. Finally it has explained the set-up of my 
patrols and how I believe I was perceive by the locals.
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4 - Physical setting 
Although Lashkar Gah is the official capital of Helmand, Gereshk is considered to 
be the commercial capital with its perfect location at the river Helmand and with 
Highway 1, an important transportation route and the only paved road in the 
area, running through Gereshk and connecting it to Farah province in the West 
and Kandahar in the east. The city consists of mixed tribes as there are 
constantly people moving to and from the city. In the last part of ISAF team 4’s 
deployment in 2007 Danish CIMIC was moved to Gereshk from Lashkar Gah, 
however, it was not possible for them to conduct more than a couple of patrols 
in the city due to security reasons. The city is roughly divided into 4 parts (see 
figure 1): Hessah-e Tank in the west was partly considered stable when I arrived. 
It is very structured with roads running parallel which is due to an old Russian 
master plan that development initiatives in 2008 were still influenced by. East of 
Hessah-e Tank is Deh-e Adam Khan. This area was a mixture of tribes, narrow 
streets and compounds randomly built as it was not a part of the master plan. 
Since it was not a part of the development plan no initiatives were made and it 
served as a safe haven for Taliban fighters. In the fall of 2008 Deh-e Adam Khan 
was finally included in the master plan and long-term development projects 
could be initiated. South of Hessah-e Tank, separated by Highway 1, is the old 
part of the city, Deh-e Mazang. Deh-e Mazang was relatively stable; the security 
for the locals was alright and the situation was similar to Hessah-e Tank. To the 
east is Sarvajan Kaley, this part was most often referred to as the bazaar because 
it consisted of the bazaar, the hospital, school, women’s’ centre and police 
station. The locals often expressed that the bazaar was the safest place however, 
it was the complete opposite for ISAF forces because it was extremely difficult to 
secure in the sense that there were so much traffic in one place and the density 
of people. Therefore, after losing the CIMIC support team in spring 2008, it was 
‘out of bounds’ to conduct patrols in the bazaar thus I only drove through it. In 
the rural area from Gereshk to patrol base line (see figure 1) I conducted CIMIC 
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work. The locals once told me that the government had no influence in the area 
since there was more than 3 kilometres to the nearest government building. 
Figure 1 
DEH-E ADAM 
KHAN 
CAMP PRICE 
SARVAJAN KALEY/ 
BAZAAR 
DEH-E MAZANG 
HESSAH-E TANK 
PATROL BASELINE 
CANAL ROAD 
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5 – Balancing between security and development 
The following chapter entails my experiences in Afghanistan. It is written in a 
diary style based on memory, pictures, my personal mission diary and patrol 
reports that were based on field notes. (See section 2.6). The events included in 
this chapter, I have selected because they reveal the conditions of the work I 
conducted, my engagement with the local community and how ethical 
considerations were done while revealing different notions of security as enabler 
for development projects. The chapter is thus structured like a diary with 
comments after each recounted event which will be analysed and discussed in 
the following chapter. 
5.1 Experiences in the security-development nexus 
September 1st 2008. 
Anders (my commanding officer) came up to me yesterday and asked me to go 
to an area just outside Gereshk and talk to the local nationals. There has been an 
incident where a vehicle from a combat logistical patrol going from Armadillo to 
Price had almost run over a child because the child had come too close to the 
patrol and was suddenly invisible in the sky of dust surrounding the vehicles. 
Thus, Anders wanted me to go and ask the locals to tell their children to not 
come too close to the vehicles when patrols were driving by, in order to prevent 
a future tragedy. Today I went out there with a British force protection unit. 
When we approached the coordinate I was given I saw about 9 children (patrol 
report) smiling and waving at us but as we pulled up to them, stopped and 
dismounted the vehicles they immediately ran into the compound ground which 
was bound by a low wall. This is not a new reaction to me in places we have not 
been before. When the force protection unit was in place they signalled to me 
that it was okay for me and the interpreter to go and talk to the four local males 
(patrol report) sitting on the ground in front of a small building. I greeted them in 
the few Pashto sentences I knew and they returned the greeting. The 
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atmosphere was relaxed (patrol report) and we engaged in a conversation, 
through my interpreter, about my safety concerns for the children but I 
remembered to stress that we really did appreciate the children waving at the 
patrols when they drove by, thinking to myself that this is a good indicator of the 
situation and could help reveal any presence of Taliban. (Mission diary). The 
children had all gathered around us and were looking, pointing and happily 
engaging with the force protection unit. One man, Mohammed, had taken the 
lead explaining that he was the mullah of the area. He asked me if it was possible 
to help them with the mosque, the building they sat in front of. He explained 
that he used it for educating 14 children from the neighbourhood but he did not 
have any stationaries or other materials. (Patrol report). When I asked him if he 
had other needs in the area, he revealed that the well at the mosque was dry. 
(Patrol report). I felt happy because not only had Jens, my driver, put some 
notebooks, pencils, tea and a football in the car to give to them for their 
understanding (mission diary) but also because building wells is a so-called quick-
impact-project which could help the locals’ situation as well as gain support for 
ISAF’s presence in the area. We agreed to come back and start the well project 
and he said that we were very welcome and we then said that we would like to 
give him some stuff for the children, but that we would like him to hand it out to 
them in an orderly manner. I feel that this is the best way to avoid chaos and 
prevent children from crawling onto vehicles to look after things on own 
initiative. Jens went to our car to get the box of stuff when I was interrupted by 
Joshua from NATO Channel who had joined the patrol to get some pictures and a 
small interview for a video clip on CIMIC he was doing. I really despise cameras 
and but I am slowly accepting the political role that I feel especially CIMIC 
soldiers have. (Mission diary) I realised that this was not the time to be difficult. 
Every second on the ground has to count because the threat of an attack was 
increasing by the minute. He asked me a couple of question and it was over. 
Meanwhile Jens had found the box of stuff and as he brought it to the mullah the 
children’s eyes lit up. We said our goodbyes and left the mullah with a promise 
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to come back and start the well project. The children waved as we drove off. This 
evening I stood on the ramp10 looking at Gereshk feeling frustrated because I feel 
that there is so much to do but because I can only go with force protection and 
for a limited time even the smallest task becomes complicated. (Mission diary) 
Comment: This episode reveals what I would define as a typical way of 
identifying projects. It also reveals how the job that we (ISAF) needed to do, in 
order to prevent a local child from being killed by our vehicles, were constantly 
needed to be portrayed in order to gain political consent for the mission back 
home. Moreover it reveals how I was introduced to a new area; having no 
background information I would go out and find what was there; who were these 
people and what were their needs. This assessment was made in only minutes as 
the security situation only allowed us to be at the same spot in between 5 and 10 
minutes depending on the situation. 
November 1st 2008. 
Today I was on a very diverse patrol in the sense that I was conducting very 
different tasks. First I went to Seminar Dwam School, a school located in Hessah-
e Tank, to get information about the school. I have been there before but it has 
never been open until now. As we (the force protection unit, my driver, my 
interpreter and I) went in no one greeted us but after just a few minutes, pupils 
were hanging out of the windows to greet us. (Patrol report) When we went into 
the building the children were swarming around us until an older pupil came 
with a raised stick, then they all ran back to their classroom. The teacher was 
polite and provided me with answers to my inquiries about the school but every 
time I visit a school I am introduced to some new riddle to solve. Is the 
headmaster not who I was told? Is there a new head of education in Gereshk? 
And because I cannot schedule meetings due to security I sometimes do not 
meet the people I actually need to talk to in order to start up projects. We were 
allowed a tour of the school. There are some challenges as it does not live up tp 
                                                          
10
 Planned firing positions for armored personnel carriers or tanks in the area defense of Price. 
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the official requirements. The school is a modern building with fans in the ceiling, 
lights and toilets instead of the usual latrines. (Patrol report) However, since 
there is no electricity none of it functions, the toilets are a health hazard and the 
well is placed just eight meters from the toilets instead of the required 30 
meters. (Patrol report) I took a lot of notes and I cannot wait to get back so I can 
compile a new school report for the education advisor in Lashkar Gah. 
The second stop on the patrol was at a shop at one of the main roads in Gereshk. 
People always wave when our patrol passes so I have wanted to go there to talk 
to them for a while. (Patrol report) As we approached them we were welcomed 
and they seemed to be in a good mood. I asked the questions I usually ask when 
in a new area; how do you think the security situation is in the area? What are 
your main challenges? Who do you think can help you? And they were happy to 
reply. After just a couple of minutes we were talking like we were old friends and 
I could not help but to feel uplifted. They have belief in the government, (patrol 
report) or so they said, and interestingly enough they referred to Abdul Raziq, 
the ‘second-in-command’ in the police, as ‘the public commander of the Afghan 
National Police’. (Patrol report) I was not surprised by any of their statements. It 
appears that people in the city have more belief in the government whereas just 
three kilometres from the centre of Gereshk, they tell me that the government 
has nothing to do with them. (Mission diary) Also, the British police mentors 
have noticed that Raziq appears to be the one talking and pulling the strings and 
not the official chief of police.  
I promised my colleagues that I would help them by handing out wind up radios 
to the locals and ask them what kind of music they like to hear in order to give 
the information to the new local radio station Radio Gereshk. I love asking this 
question because the locals often never know how to react. (Sometimes I think it 
is because Taliban has told them that when ISAF soldiers come they are on a 
killing mission, or perhaps because our conversation is very different from what 
they had expected. Once, a man was sure that when I came to the village it was 
because I wanted to search their houses, so he was quite surprised when I 
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handed him a radio and asked him questions about the conditions of the village 
bridge.) This time they laughed and then a younger boy said that they listened to 
Pashto music. (Patrol report) I then noticed that three women had appeared in 
the back of the shop wearing only a little scarf over their heads instead of the 
tradition burka. They were smiling and pointing at me and I decided to take the 
chance and ask the oldest woman for her name and she answered while her 
husband, the shop owner, did not seem to mind at all (patrol report) which I took 
as a sign that he was not as strict about the rules of his wife as some Afghan 
men. 
The third stop was at Mr Hakim, another shop owner I have met a couple of 
times. Jens had the idea to print a picture of their little daughter who is always 
present to give to Mr Hakim. (Patrol report) He thanked us and we had a 
conversation about how the electricity system works before talking about the 
possibility of starting up a project for the women. He then said that he would ask 
his wife if this was something she would like. (Patrol report)  I was not the only 
one a bit surprised by that statement; the interpreter told me as we left “I think 
Mr. Hakim really likes his wife”. (Mission diary) She appeared in the back of the 
shop as I was telling Mr Hakim that they should also think about courses that 
could help the unemployed in the area. (Patrol report) I greeted her and she 
smiled. I feel that with regards to my gender, the signalling effect is really 
effective in Gereshk where women are peeping from their compounds to see and 
wave to me as I drive by. (Mission diary) The last stop was at the Blue Shura Hall 
where I had to document the delivery of 500 chairs as a part of a 
‘samtænkningsprojekt’. In general, it was a really good patrol today; the 
atmospheric in the city was very good with a lot of people waving and smiling, 
especially little girls. (Patrol report) 
Comment: This patrol reveals how I would go out and hope that I would meet the 
people I needed to talk to. As mentioned in the previous section, we could not 
stay at a place for more than a couple of minutes and scheduling a meeting was 
completely out of the question as it would give Taliban the opportunity to plan 
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an ambush. I could therefore also not make a time plan for a project with the 
locals; they would call me (if they had a telephone) and say that they were so far 
along and I would say that I would visit sometime within the week. If I needed 
longer meetings I would ask the locals to meet me in Price, which was safe for 
me but for necessarily for them as it meant that they would have to walk some 
ten kilometres, they could recognised and in addition they had to be  searched 
twice on their way to the main gate of the camp. 
November 24th 2008. 
I feel that the security situation is worsening in some places of my area. (Mission 
diary) Two weeks ago I was told by the locals in Clifton area that Taliban had 
woken the entire village, gathered and threatened them against working with 
ISAF forces. (Patrol report) When they tell me this they are anxious and say that 
they cannot even trust the person standing next to them. I know that when I 
meet the locals Taliban is watching and I do not know what to do. I know that 
they need clean water and the work and money for the projects but at the same 
time I realise that I cannot quite grasp how dangerous it is for them to cooperate 
with me. (Mission diary) However, they still want to continue with the projects. 
On the evening of the 20th, after having been on a good patrol, I was informed by 
our intelligence officer that they had received information about an 
assassination of the Mullah in Clifton area. (Mission diary) He was shot dead by 
the Taliban just an hour after I had visited him at his mosque. Then today, Kabir 
(contractor) from Clifton came to visit me in Price. (Incident report) He explained 
that the Mullah had been sitting at the mosque where we had spoken when two 
men on motor cycles had driven by while firing at him. (Incident report) The 
people sitting around him had run for their lives the mullah however, was hit 
once in the foot and several times in his torso. (Incident report) His son had 
apparently seen it but “…since he is small he could not fire the AK-47 he has, to 
protect his father”, (incident report) because otherwise, that would have been a 
normal thing to do here. The impact of the murder was already significant as he 
was a respected man, and previously feared by the Taliban. (Patrol report) I 
34 
 
know that this is true because Jens, my driver, has seen him at the Blue Shura 
Hall11 at a meeting with the mayor, provincial governor and prominent local 
mullahs. But suddenly they had enough. I feel a little ambiguous because the 
success of our cooperation has had a part in his murder and because we cannot 
do anything to protect those who chose to cooperate with us which is such an 
important aspect in our strategy. (Mission diary) Mr Kabir refuses to be scared 
and wants to continue our work however; we agreed that we should meet at the 
patrol base in private without any spectators to our conversation. (Incident 
report) 
Comment: This incident, and the previous section, reveals how the security-
development nexus plays out very differently according to geography. The 
situation, and attitude towards the government, was very different in places just 
a couple of kilometres apart. In places that were pro-government it was much 
easier to do development, or rather to combine security and development 
because there would often also be local policy or Afghan army check points to 
provide security to the locals. In more contested, rural, places where neither 
Taliban nor government had full control, development interventions were seen 
by Taliban as part of a political project of outside occupying forces. Therefore, 
they  would target anyone working with foreign soldiers by intimidating them 
with ‘night letters’ (threat letters put on the compound door at night) or showing 
up and threatening to ‘slaughter’ them, like the following incident shows. 
November 26th 2008. 
I was on patrol today to the area which the Danish escort unit H95 has dubbed 
‘the kindergarten’ because of all the children (the place of September 24th). 
Some locals approached us as we stopped at the site of the well. They said that 
the mullah had been kidnapped 10 days ago by Taliban and that all village elders 
had negotiated with them to set him free which he was after 24 hours. (Patrol 
report) Taliban had afterwards returned to the village and explained that if the 
                                                          
11
 A new public building funded by Danish ’samtænkningsmidler’  
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locals receive money from ISAF or cooperate on development, they will find 
them and slaughter them. (Patrol report) They were directly told; “Don’t take 
money from the infidels!” (Patrol report) I get really angry with this development, 
I think that it is a cowardice way to fight, and the only ones they are really 
hurting are the locals. They however, take it more calmly and I sense that it is 
normal for them that the situation changes continuously. 
Comment: This incident, along with the previous shows how I was constantly 
navigating in the security-development nexus, but not only my security, 
particularly the local populations’ security. We (soldiers) could not conduct 
development unless we could secure an area, the threat of a suicide bomber for 
instance once made my commanding officer order me not to go to a certain area. 
The other way around I could be secure while the local population was not. 
December 4th 2008. 
Today we lost two Danish soldiers. I could follow the situation from outside the 
tactical operations centre and hear the noise from the combat just three 
kilometres from Price. (Mission diary) The reconnaissance unit had been 
ambushed and I felt paralyzed and powerless as they started to report casualties. 
(Mission diary) I followed the situation for a while until it was time for my patrol. 
I went to get my kit and as I walked out of my tent I saw that the recconnaisance 
unit had made it back to camp and had parked outside. They were just sitting 
there holding their heads, vehicle filled with cartridge cases and latex gloves with 
blood. I told them “I don’t know what to say. I am so sorry” as I realised that I 
had not at all prepared for this specific situation. (Mission diary) I then walked 
down to my force protection unit for the day, shaking off my thoughts and 
refocusing on my own patrol. 
I went back to the ‘kindergarten’ to see the mullah. He was there and confirmed 
that he had been kidnapped by the Taliban. (Patrol report) Since the well still 
needs some work I wanted to make second payment, as we had agreed, but as I 
took out the money he looked at them and told me that he could not take them 
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due to the threats and he explained that they would have to find a way to pay for 
the well themselves. (Patrol report) I was shocked that he did not take the 
money. I would never have thought that that would happen, taking their 
situation into consideration. I realise how real the threat from Taliban is. 
Moreover, I feel more and more frustrated as the situation is getting worse. 
(Mission diary) The only thing I can do is to recommend more patrolling but with 
the limited units it is not possible. In many areas the locals now want to work 
with us but they cannot find anyone who dares to work on the project. 
Comment: The above mentioned incidents reveal how the situation suddenly 
changed and Taliban increased their intimidation of the local population while 
we did not have the resources to increase patrolling in those areas thus, the 
locals were pressured into meeting the demands of Taliban. Mr Hakim, the shop 
keeper suddenly moved and closed his shop while no one would tell me why or 
where to. On December 19th the reconnaissance unit H95 suffered three 
casualties at the ‘kindergarten’. The situation did not change before I deployed 
home on the contrary, the situation deteriorated rapidly over the following year.  
5.2 Summary of chapter 5 
This chapter has revealed how patrols were conducted and given insights to the 
interaction with the locals and the character of the CIMIC work, thus how the 
acting was conducted in the security-development nexus. Moreover, it has 
described incidents in which both I and the locals have navigated in the security-
development nexus and what challenges we had respectively. 
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6 – Analysis and discussion 
This chapter will serve as the analysis and discussion of the previous empirical 
chapter. It is divided into two sections, each presenting a theme that has been 
identified in the previous chapter; navigating in the security-development nexus 
and acting in the security-development nexus. Consequently, the themes are 
focused around the considerations about security and development and how the 
ethnography of aid, the policies, influenced our work and how I attended to 
combine the two and work with the local population. Lastly the chapter will 
contain a short summary before moving onto chapter 7, the conclusion. 
6.1 Theme 1: Navigating the security-development nexus 
As the previous chapter has revealed, there is a constant change between 
security and development considerations, both from the developer’s perspective 
and the developees’. This happens because the infantry units were expected to 
provide security while CIMIC would provide development. However, in reality 
CIMIC was a part of the infantry units and the security situation in the rural areas 
was often only good in those minutes that ISAF forces were on the ground, the 
rest of the day, the rural areas were accessible to Taliban. In areas where the 
security situation was considered significantly poor; where the CIMIC team did 
not have the opportunity to follow up on projects, it was impossible to conduct 
development. Accordingly, there was more than one notion of security 
important in the considerations of development opportunities: That of the local 
population and that of the soldiers. In this notion is also the fact that security 
played out differently over time and geography. I draw on explanations of 
warscape provided by Korf et al., (2010) in order to explain how the setting can 
best be understood. They introduce the notions of governable order and 
governable space (Korf, et al., 2010) where; 
Governable orders sediment into a specific hierarchy of rules and authoritative powers, 
varying at different moments in time in a given place and in different places at the same 
moment in time.(…) and  ‘governable space’ describes the spatial configuration of 
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different overlapping governable orders in a specific place and time (Korf, et al., 2010, p. 
390) 
As presented in the previous chapter, the presence of the government (and 
thereby security check points) created conditions for development, although it 
varied over time as the incident at the ‘kindergarten’ among other, revealed. The 
security was constantly changing depending on time, space and our presence. 
Korf et al., (2010) explains the phenomena with the presence of multiple 
governable orders, each presenting different sources of normativity, legitimation 
and coercion expressed either by Taliban or security forces. Their idea (Korf, et 
al., 2010), that there is a complex interplay of competing systems (or governable 
orders) and that they are hieratically nested and experienced in different time 
and space (governable spaces), thereby appropriately corresponds to my 
experiences. Korf et al., (2010) draws on Vigh’s navigation metaphor which 
explains how local populations in warscapes navigate through the perilous 
terrain of the given power topography thereby contributes to its re-shaping. The 
existence of this complex interplay and need for navigation reveals how the 
struggle for security was continuous and omnipresent. I will elaborate more on 
navigation in the following section. 
6.2 Theme 2: Acting in the security-development nexus 
Firstly, as the previous chapters has revealed; the work we conducted, the 
character of the projects, was highly influenced by the ethnography of aid; 
politics, as explained by Mosse (2004) and de Sardan (2010). The stories of our 
work was largely documented and it was no secret that this was a part of our 
task from day one, as the power point slide has also mentioned; CIMIC is to make 
politics work. Mosse’s explanation: “At best, the relationship between policy and 
practice is understood in terms of an unintended ‘gap’” (Mosse, 2004, p. 640) and 
“The logic of political mobilization and the logic of operations is different.” 
(Mosse, 2004, p. 651), draws attention to an important point: In the security-
development nexus it is also a question of translating development policies into 
a language that can be understood by the military. Stepputat (2012) explains that 
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at every step of the translation, new actors or scales are involved, generating 
new spaces of contestation. He adds: 
Thus, ‘policies’ in development organizations were ‘concepts’ in the armed forces. Military 
employees talk about the ‘tactical’ level, while development people refer to the ‘local’ 
level. Everyday notions of development policy such as ‘local ownership’, ‘sustainability’ 
and ‘participation’ had to be introduced as new ‘concepts’ in the armed forces (…) and so 
on. (Stepputat, 2012, p. 444) 
My work was sometimes connected to the development strategies and at other 
times it was the military objectives that dominated my effort. Attempting to 
have the two meet, the effect based operations approach would describe how 
security forces should secure an area or reassure the local population that they 
were they to stay, but in reality it was a simplistic way of translating what 
needed to be done in order to create the conditions for development. How do 
you reassure? Yes, we did go out at talk to the local population, and it did have a 
good impact on the atmospherics however, when it did not work our resources 
to take actions were limited. Likewise, the reality my work was much more 
comprehensive than my training prepared me for and in addition, the tasks that 
were demanded; the comprehensive approach, in Helmand, implicated us to 
meet the demands of multiple actors and priorities. 
Perhaps because we did not have traditional backgrounds within development, I 
do not recognise de Sardan’s (2005) critical description of prejudice of 
developers towards the local population, rather the contrary: We did not view 
the peasants as either poor or opportunists or were let down in our expectations 
because we did not know what to expect. We were aware that some would lie to 
‘milk’ us for money or other goods and unsurprisingly that did happen, as de 
Sardan (2005) also acknowledges, but on the other hand we also experienced 
that even if the security situation would not allow for projects, they would still 
invite us for tea or a meal or at least a talk. Perhaps a subconscious awareness of 
the warscape and its shifting character, made us acknowledge that the locals had 
to navigate after what they thought could benefit them mostly at the time. 
Summing up the character of our projects were overall influenced by the 
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ethnography of aid, the official policies and priorities, but at the last resort, the 
warscape; “’the condition of war’” (Korf, et al., 2010), was setting the conditions 
of the character of our work. 
As the previous chapters have provided information about the framework of my 
work and how it was conducted on a practical level it is revealed how random 
and unstructured the CIMIC work was in reality. Although I realised, as described 
in chapter 3, that the logical framework approach was unlikely impossible for us 
to do, looking back I am still surprised how ad hoc my work really was. When de 
Sardan (2005) explains how much time and emphasis development actors often 
put into evaluating projects, it stands in direct contrast to the reality of the CIMIC 
work I conducted which in which the final assessment was a picture of the 
finished project and then on to the next one while I was juggling between some 
30 projects at a time. De Sarden (2005) is also right when arguing that the 
justification of a project has little in common with the project itself: We (soldiers 
in the CIMIC detachment) would for instance ask how many families would 
benefit from it (e.g. a well) as it was a requirement that it was accessible for 
everyone in that community, but in reality it was impossible to know whether or 
not this was actually true. The quick impact projects really were aimed at 
creating a quick impacts and consent for our presence. In addition, we could not 
plan the project from start to end; I would ask the contractor what the expected 
time frame for the project was and mostly it succeeded within that and I only 
had a couple of projects cancelled. To add to my observations, I felt that it was 
that it was impossible to create continuity in the work for more than 6 months at 
a time until the next CIMIC team took over and the priorities had changed. There 
were some exceptions to the randomness of running projects: Some of the CIMIC 
support teams allocated to forward operation bases in even more insecure areas 
did not manage to conduct more than one or two projects because of the 
perilous situation. In this case the infantry unit (often consisting of some 8 British 
military mentors and an Afghan platoon of 30 soldiers) could not provide the 
security necessary for creating conditions for CIMIC projects. Their location was a 
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part of the ‘ink spot strategy’ in which it was thought that by spreading security 
(bases) all over, security would eventually float together like ink spots on a map, 
to put it simplistically. 
In Price, CIMIC were actors caught in the middle of two worlds in which we had 
to act after the prioritisation of those decided by governments in UK or Denmark, 
ISAFs directives, the Afghan Government’s priorities, the district governor’s 
directive, what the population wanted, the battle groups’ tasks for the moment 
and the finite resources we had. Summing up, while the long-term development 
projects were contemplated by the stabilisation advisor, it was more accepted 
that the outcome of some of the CIMIC projects could not be fully predicted; we 
saw a bettering in the security situation as a window of opportunity in which we 
had to deliver quick impact projects to the local population in order to ‘win 
hearts and minds’ which essentially was the purpose of the CIMIC work. The 
incidents of murder and kidnapping reveals how we were incapable of 
countering a worsening in the situation and protect the locals, as we could only 
recommend increased patrolling, but it was not up to us to decide where to put 
main effort; as explained by the multiple priorities the battle group had to live up 
to. 
With my tasks I was busy, and while the conditions for my work did not allow me 
to engage with the local population for more than minutes at a time my 
identification of the ‘needs’ of the local became exactly as de Sardan (2005) 
critically describes it: 
This is an example of the ‘supply’ producing the ‘demand’. Villagers, when questioned by 
‘experts’, civil servants and other consultants who arrive in their village to do ‘rapid field 
studies’, express ‘needs’ and ‘demands’ that are mainly determined by what they think 
the experts, civil servants or consultants in question are prepared to offer them. Hence, 
the identification of needs is merely a method of justifying, with the help of ‘what the 
peasants say’ and of hasty surveys, projects that the development operators had already, 
more or less, been carrying all along in their briefcases under the guise of ‘offers’ (de 
Sardan, 2005, pp. 85-86) 
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Although I realised that the locals would react to my appearance, (for instance 
the fact that when I was asking them how they thought the security situation 
was in the area, I was surrounded by infantry and wearing helmet, body armour 
and carrying two weapons), I did not feel that the situation allowed me to get 
more in depth with the assessment. In that situation our (ISAF soldiers’) security 
was more important than the development of the area. Still, the assessments 
created the foundation of our strategy for future development just as de Sardan 
(2005) explains: 
So many ‘rapid field studies’ have been botched, so many hasty impressions have been 
transformed into truths ‘resulting from fieldwork’, so many interviews with a single 
individual have been dubbed ‘knowledge of a culture’, so many village meetings have 
been turned into ‘needs analysis’. (de Sardan, 2005, p. 86) 
Due to the security situation I also ended up adapting my approach so that 
instead of meeting with more locals at the time in order to make my assessment, 
I was sometimes, in some places, forced to meet at a distant location with the 
contractor alone. That way the idea of wining hearts and minds of the 
community became more difficult, yet I maintained my connection to the area 
and relation to the locals. 
While it was most often easy to start projects with the locals, it was more 
complicated to sell the idea of specific projects such as those for the women. I 
once concluded a project started by the CIMIC team before me; it was a rather 
large white mosque in a rural area. I imagined that the project might give the 
opportunity for other projects, perhaps a project for the women, in the future 
but when I asked the village elder he said that it would probably not be a good 
idea because he did not want to provoke Taliban. Meanwhile we were standing 
there at what resembled the Taj Mahal in the modest surroundings.  In that way 
the locals, though respecting the risk they took, was sometimes successful in 
achieving their objective without making commitments to either Taliban or ISAF. 
Korf et al., (2010) provides good explanation for this behaviour describing the 
behaviour of locals in warscapes: “Ambiguity creates both threats and 
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opportunities, but the implications for navigation may be quite different for an 
individual in a particular period and location.” (Korf, et al., 2010, p. 396) It 
seemed that they had an acceptance and understanding that the security 
situation was constantly shifting thus they took the opportunities that came their 
way. However, I do not see it as “[a  ‘weapon[s] of the weak’, who manage to 
cleverly navigate across and between conflict lines and actors characteristic of 
warscapes.” (Korf, et al., 2010, p. 388) While I do not agree that the risk s they 
took, when they chose to cooperate with CIMIC, expressed weakness.  
6.4 Summary of chapter 6 
This analytical chapter had explained how there was more than one notion of 
security that was important to the prospects of development: That of the local 
population and that of the soldiers. Moreover, security played out differently 
over time and geography which can be explained by Korf et al.’s (2010) notions 
of governable order and governable space. Because the locals were navigating in 
those warscapes, it was not always possible to sell the idea of projects that the 
development policy called for. Furthermore, I had to adjust my methods after 
how the local perceived governable order and governable space, to which I could 
sometime only react e.g. by making recommendations. My work was much more 
extensive than what I had imagined it to be; we were attempting to do the work 
of both development actors and security forces at the same time while overall 
being caught in the struggle to translate development strategies and meet the 
priorities of multiple actors. 
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7- Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the most important findings from the 
analytical chapter in order to answer the problem formulation. 
I started this project by presenting the following problem formulation: 
How do soldiers who are involved and emplaced in the security-development 
nexus experience and deal with the tensions inherent between security and 
development? 
I will commence by addressing my experiences, that there is more than one 
notion of security that we had to deal with in order to conduct development 
projects; our own security and that of the local population. If either one of them 
was not present in was not possible to carry out any projects. I would attempt to 
deal with the challenges by adjusting my methods, for instance inviting the locals 
for meetings in the camp or meeting with them in a remote location however, 
that would sometimes increase the risks of the locals as it was easier for Taliban 
to identify their movement. Adding another dimension to security I furthermore 
experienced that it would change over time and space, which can be explained 
by Korf et al., (2010) notions of governable order and governable space: The 
warscape in my area of operation was influenced by different authoritarian 
powers (governable order) differing between the security forces and Taliban 
which was never static but constantly changing over time and place (governable 
space). The struggle for security was thus constantly omnipresent. 
In addition, I felt that I was left incapable of responding to the challenges that 
e.g. the security situation brought with it. If the situation was not allowing us to 
conduct development projects, either due to our own security or that of the local 
people, it would simply not happen: “’the condition of war’” (Korf, et al., 2010), 
was setting the conditions of our work, but most importantly it was the limited 
resources that left us to react instead of taking actions.  
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The limited resources in the mission also made the character of my work was 
much more extensive than what I had imagined it to be; conducting both long-
term development projects at times in addition to CIMIC work kept me busy. It is 
interesting to observe that while it has been recognised that development and 
security are interlinked, the comprehensive approach has not really addressed 
the issue of resources. Stepputat (2012) write about the comprehensive 
approach that; 
(…) the armed forces were crying for more civilian involvement, arguing that development 
and reconstruction was not the domain of the army but that the armed forces had to 
engage in these tasks as long as the foreign ministry did not provide (sufficient) people 
with this expertise. (Stepputat, 2012, p. 449) 
Also Veicherts12 mentions the need for resources in the mission to solve civilian 
tasks, but that these capacities should not be provided by the military. Finally, 
the development policy, and thus our work, was highly political, influenced by 
multiple actors, and we used effect terms in order to translate the policies into 
tasks which left a quite open opportunity for interpretation.
                                                          
12 Veicherts, N. T, (2005) Hvorfor samtænkning af militær og civil indsats er nødvendig i felten, 
DIIS Brief 
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8 - Afterthoughts 
The research has revealed some areas that would be interesting for further 
research: For instance it has been revealed that when the security-development 
nexus is operationalized through a comprehensive approach, which in the case of 
Afghanistan has given the military a leading role, it becomes extremely important 
to look into the Effect Based Operations approach to see if it really translates 
development policies into military actions in the most expedient way. But most 
importantly I found that it is necessary to look at the resources allocated to the 
implementation of development strategies in the security-development nexus, 
not thinking that it is possible for security forces to take on the tasks of both 
security and development without assigning extra units. And if, as Veicherts 
(2005) points to, it is not a task for the security forces then there is a need for a 
discussion about the future role of development agencies in development 
interventions.
47 
 
Bibliography 
Books: 
Amer, R., Swain, , A. & Ojendal, J., 2012. Security-Development Nexus. London: Anthem 
Press. 
Bryman, A., 2008. Social Research Methods. 3 ed. Oxford: Oxford university Press. 
de Sardan, J.-P. O., 2005. Anthropology & Development: Understanding Contemporary 
Social Change. London: Zed Books. 
Guest, G., Namey, E. & Mitchell, M., 2013. Collecting Qualitative Data: A field manual for 
applied research. California: Sage Publications. 
Journal articles: 
Beall, J., Goodfellow, T. & Putzel, J., 2006. Policy Arena: Introductory Article: On the 
Discourse of Terrorism, Security and Development. Journal of International 
Development, Issue 18, pp. 51-67. 
Brigg, M. & Bleiker, R., 2010. Autoethnographic International Relations: exploring the 
self as a source of knowledge. Review of International Studies, 36(3) Juli, pp. 779-798. 
Chandler, D., 2007. The security development nexus and the rise of 'anti-foreign policy'. 
Journal of International Relations and Development, 10, pp. 362-386. 
Korf, B., Engeler , M. & Hagmann, . T., 2010. The Geography of Warscape. Third World 
Quarterly, 31(3), pp. 385-399. 
Mosse, D., 2004. Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of 
Aid Policy and Practice. Development and Change, 35(4), p. 639–671. 
Neumann, I., 2010. Autobiography, ontology autoethnology. Review of International 
Studies, 36 (4) October, pp. 1051-1055. 
Stepputat, F., 2012. Knowledge production in the security-development nexus: an 
ethonographic reflection. Security Dialogue, 43 5, pp. 439-455. 
Reports: 
IPA, T. S.-D. P., 2004. Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing 
International Policy and Practice Since the 1990s, New York: International Peace 
Academy. 
Ministries, D. a. F. M. D., 2008. Den Danske Indsats i Afghanstan 2008-2012. [Online]  
Available at: 
48 
 
http://www.fmn.dk/temaer/afghanistan/baggrundforindsatsen/Documents/dansk_inds
ats_Afgh_2008_2012.pdf 
[Accessed 10 February 2013]. 
Stepputat, Buur & Jensen, 2007. The security-development nexus : expressions of 
sovereignty and securitization in Southern Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 
Online sources:  
Ahmad, M., 2009. Taliban commander: We're fighting for 'independence'. [Online]  
Available at: http://worldblog.nbcnews.com/_news/2009/11/18/4376958-taliban-
commander-were-fighting-for-independence?lite 
[Accessed 20 May 2013]. 
Kakar, P., n.d. Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women’s Legislative Authority. [Online]  
Available at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf 
[Accessed 20 May 2013]. 
 
 
